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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 14833 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff, Boise Cascade Corporation, from 
a Judgment entered on the 20th day of October, 1976, by the Honorable Marcellus 
K. Snow, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's Motion for Sum~ary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's action 
was granted and an order to that effect was entered by the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County on October 20, 1976. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Summary Judgment d · grante 1n favor 
of the Defendants and for a Judgment in its favor as a matter of law, on the 
ground that the Utah statutory dower provision, Section 74-4-3 Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953), is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. Defendants and 
Respondents seek to have the Order of the Third Judicial District Court, dis-
cussed herein, upheld in its entirety. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant Ls Statement of th.e Facts set forth in its Brief is correct 
and is not disputed by Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AMD APPLIED SECTION 
74-4-3, UTAH CODE AtlNOTATED, WHICH CREATES AN INTEREST FOR A WIFE IN THE 
HUSBAND'S REAL PROPERTY. 
A wife's right in real estate possessed by her husband, is set forth 
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 74-4-3, as amended in 1953. This provision of 
the Code provides as follows: 
"WIFE'S INTEREST IN HUSBAND'S REAL PROPERTY. 
One-third in value of all of the legal or equitable estates 
in real property possessed by the husband at any time during 
the marriage, to which the wife has made no relinquishment 
of her rights, shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, 
if she survives him; provided, that the wife shall not be 
entitled to any interest under the provisions of this Section 
in any such estate of which the husband has maJe a conveyance 
when the wife, at the time of the conveyance, was not and never 
had been a resident of the territory or state of Utah. Property 
distributed under the provisions of this Section shall be free 
- 2 -
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from all debts of the decedent except those secured by liens for 
~ork or labor done or material furnished exclusively for the 
improvement of the same, and except those created for the purchase 
thereof, and for taxes levied thereon. The value of such part 
of the homestead as may be set aside to the widow shall be 
deducted from the distributive share provided for her in this 
Section. In cases wherein only the heirs, devisees and legatees 
of the decedent are interested, the property secured to the 
widow by this Section may be set off by the Court in due process 
of administration." 
This statute clearly establishes a real property interest in wives 
who qualify under the Statute. This statute is couched in unambiguous language 
and clearly sets forth the requirements which must be met before a wife can 
participate in the rights described in this statute. This statute sets up the 
equivalent of a Dower right for wives in the State of Utah. 
There are several Utah cases which discuss the rights of a married 
woman in and to real estate possessed by her husband. The landmark case in 
Utah in connection with a woman's dower rights is the case of Hilton v. Thatcher 
~·, 31 Utah 360, 88 Pac. 20 (1906). The facts in the Hilton case are 
essentially the same as the facts in the present case. In ~a widow who 
had not released or joined in her husband's conveyance of some real property 
possessed by him, sought a court determination of her rights to share in this 
real property. The Court held that a wife, unless she releases her right 
thereto, must be provided with one third of the land of which her husband 
1·1as seized at any time during the marriage. The Court concluded that the 
existence of this property right in a wife is entirely within the control 
of the Legislature. 
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The Hilton, supra, case is interesting in that it provides an ex-
cellent historical analysis of a woman's rights to real property in the State 
of Utah. As the Court in Hilton points out, the common law dov1er right was 
abrogated in the State of Utah when the Congress of the United States enacted 
a law in 1887, providing that: 
"A widow shall be endowed of a third part of all the lands 
whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance 
at any time during the marriage unless she shall have lawfully 
released her right thereto." {P. 2) 
(Comp. Laws Utah 1888, 1919). 
In 1898 when Utah entered into the Un ion as a State, LAWS OF UTAH 
were enacted which gave essentially the same rights to a widow. Section 2826 
of the Revised Statutes of Utah provided as follows: 
"One third in value of all the legal or equitable estates in 
real property possessed by the husband at any time during 
marriage, and to which the wife had made no relinquishment 
of her rights, shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, 
if she survive him." 
The modern-day equivalent of this statute is Section 74-11-3 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, referred to earlier in this Brief. This brief historical 
analysis makes it clear that the long-standing intent of the lawmakers in the 
State of Utah has been to provide a wife with real property rights in her 
husband's estate. 
Thus, a wid01·1's right to an interest in the lands of her husband 
has been continuous from 1887 to the present time in the State of Utah. The 
long history of this law makes it obvious that the citizens of the State of 
Utah are cognizant of this Jaw, recognize the ir:iportance of it and, further, 
that Utahns take this Jaw into account when they plan their 1 ives. 
-4-
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Another Utah case, Hatch v. Hatch, 148 Pac. 1096 (1915), also 
discussed the equitable rights of a married woman in her husband's real property. 
In this case the administrator of a wife's estate sued to recover from the 
executor of her husband's property, alleged to have been the wife's separate 
estate, that share which should have been the wife's. The Utah Supreme Court 
in this case also discussed the historical development of a woman's real property 
rights in the State of Utah. A reading of this case is helpful in understanding 
the equitable approach toward women and their property rights in the State of 
Utah. The Court in Hatch v. Hatch, supra, refers to the case of Hilton v. 
Thatcher, discussed herein, and makes the following observation in connection 
with the dower law in Utah: 
"The people of the territory (Utah) tacitly agreed upon 
maxims and principles of the common law suited to their 
condition and consistent with the constitution and laws of 
the United States. 11 (P. 1099) 
Clearly, one of the principles of the common Jaw which the Legislature of the 
State of Utah has deemed to be suited to the conditions and needs of the State 
of Utah, and consistent with the Constitution is Section 74-4-3 of the Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). Section 74-4-3,earlier cited, is the modern day equiva-
Jent and outgrowth of the common Jaw principle which the Legislature for the 
State of Utah adopted early in the State's history and has consistently included 
in Utah law ever since that time. 
The Court in Hatch v. Hatch, supra, points out that under the old 
English Common Law and the early Roman Law, the r.iarital power of the husband 
was absolute, and the 1vife had no legal existence apart from that of her 
- 5 -
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husband. Under these legal systems a wife could neither acquire nor hold 
property and was incapable of doing anything as a "ferrw sole". The husband, 
at the time of the marriage, became the possessor of tire wife's property and 
had the right to sell said property without her consent. In return, he was 
made liable for her debts, torts, misdemeanors, and some crimes. These ardiaic 
legal systems have long since been specifically abolished, and in their stead 
a concept of the husband and wife as "partners" has developed. This is the at· 
titude which is reflected by the Utah Code Annotated, Section 74-4-3. 
The Utah State Supreme Court in Hatch v. Hatch, dee ided in I 915 that 
the "dower" right was vital for the equitable treatment of women. 
In the case before the Court, Jeanne D. Meyer meets the requirements 
of Sect ion 74-4-3 of the Utah Code Annotated for pa rt i c i pat ion in the "dower" 
rights discussed herein. Jeanne D. Meyer made no relinquishment of her rights 
in this property, she was married to Ster! ing A. Meyer at the time the propercy 
was acquired and possessed by him and she is now and has been a resident of 
Utah for many years. 
Further, the property which is the subject of this action, is not 
subject to any materialman's I ien. 
Finally, it is important to note that the Utah Statute, 74-4-3 refers 
to the property in which the wife shares, as a "homestead". The use of this word 
is a clear indication of the fact that the Utah Legislature saw this property 
as a "home" for a wife, and possibly for her children as we! I. A woman's 
. . • d b 't ·s still 
"place" in soctety has changed radically 1n the last deca e, ut, 1 I 
accurate to state that more often than not wor:ien out! ive men, and then need to 
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make or maintain a home for themselves or themselves and their children, without; 
the support of their husbands. It is also still a fact that men still make 
many or most of the business decisions for their families; business decisions 
which might result in the loss of family property. 
Courts have taken these facts into account in the drafting of dower 
and dower-like statutes. 
In the case at hand the Defendant, Sterling A. Meyer, did make some 
business decisions which resulted in the incurring of debt. The Plaintiff and 
Appellant sued him on such a debt and is now seeking to enforce its judgment 
against all of the real property in question. This situation is the very situa-
tion the Utah Legislature foresaw and attempted to prevent with Section 74-4-3 
of the Utah Code Annotated. The District Court saw this and correctly inter-
preted and applied this statute in this case. 
PO trlT 11 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SHO\/ THAT SECTIOtl 74-4-3 OF THE UTAH CODE ArlNOTATED j 
IS UNCOIJSTITUTIOll EITHER AS A DEtllAL OF EQUAL PROTECTJOtl OR AS A DEtHAL OF I 
DUE P fl.O C ES S. .
1
. 
The la1~ is 1-1ell settled that a distinction for purposes of legislative•. 
classification, based on sex, does not necessarily constitute a denial of l 
Equal Protection where the classification bears some reasonable or rational j 
relation to the object sought to be accomplished by the Legislature. This rule 1 
was established in the case of Anderson v. St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 North-
west 2d 538. It is a further wel I established legal conclusion that the Equal 
Protection clause of the Constitution does not require absolute equality. This 
- 7 -
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rule is set forth in the case of Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 82 L. 
Ed 252, 58 S. Ct. 205 (1937). 
Breedlove v. Suttles dealt with the question of the constitutionali~ 
of a poll tax which applied unequally as between men and women. The law in 
question provided that in the case of women, registration for voting 11as per-
mitted without payment of taxes for previous years, whereas in the case of men, 
registration was not permitted without the payment of taxes. The Court in this 
case held that: 
"Women may be exempted (from the payment of poll taxes) on the 
basis of special considerations to which they are naturally 
entitled. In view of burdens necessarily bourne by them for 
the preservation of the race, the State reasonably may exempt 
them from the taxes." (82 L. Ed., P. 255) 
The statute in this case is similar to the statute in our case. Both 
statutes treat women and establish what are allegedly reverse discrimination 
Jaws. In Breedlove, the Supreme Court found that there was no denial of Equal 
Protection and the Court stated that the Equal Protection clause of the Consti-
tut ion does not require absolute equality. 
The right to have a roof over one's head or a "homestead" seems to be 
an even more vital interest, deserving the Legislature's recognition and the 
State's protection, than the right to vote. Therefore, one can conclude that 
it is uni ikely that the Supreme Court would find a denial of Equal Protection 
in our situation. 
Appellant cites the SuprerT1e Court case of Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 35!, 
40 L. Ed. 2d 189, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974} as support for their position thatthe 
· · 1 K,..hn v. Sh"v"1n is improperly cited as Utah dower statute is unconstttut1ona . ~ -
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support for this position. In point of fact, Kahn v. Shevin supports Respondent' 
contention that the statute in question 22_ constitutional. 
Kahn v. Shevin, supra, involves a Florida statute which grants widows, 
but not widowers, an annual $500 property tax exemption. The statute allegedly 
set up reverse discrimination, a situation not unlike the Utah Statute in 
question. In Kahn v. Shevin, the Supreme Court ruled that the statute did not 
violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
State's differential treatment of widows and widowers had a rational basis and 
had fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. That is 
to say, that the statute accomplished the reasonable objective of cushioning 
the financial impact of the loss of a spouse upon the sex for whom that loss 
imposes a disproportionately heavy burde~. The Court in this case stated that, 
"there can be no dispute that the financial difficulties confronting the lone 
woman in Florida or in any other state exceed those facing the lone man," 
(90 L. Ed. 2d at p. 192). The Supreme Court in this case referred to the 
"disparity between the economic capabilities of a man and a woman". This same 
disparity exists in Utah and forms part of the rational basis for Section 
74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated. Also, a desire by the Utah Legislature to alleviate 
economic hardship for widows in Utah was the object of enacting this statute. 
In support of this statement regarding economic ability, data supplied 
by the U. s. Department of Labor, showing the median earnings for men and women 
for the years from 1955 to 1972 was set out in the Supreme Court's decision in 
Kahn. The tables of data are set forth herein, since they are clearly relevant 
- 9 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the Utah statute, and they lend support for Respondents' 
content ion that ther,, 
is a rational basis for the differential treatment of wido115 and widowers in 
connect ion with real property interests in the State of Utah. 
"The Women's Bureau provides the fol lowing data: 
\/omen's median 
Median earn i n~s earnings as 
Year Women Men percent of men's 
1972 $5,903 $10,202 57.9 
1971 5,593 9,399 59.5 
1970 5,323 8,966 59.4 
1969 4,977 8,227 60.5 
1963 4,457 7,664 58.2 
1967 4,150 7' 182 57.S 
1966 3,973 6,848 58.0 
I 965 3,823 6,375 60.0 
1964 3,690 6, 195 59.6 
1963 3,561 5,978 59.6 
1962 3,446 5,794 59.4 
1961 3,351 5,664 59.4 
1960 3,293 5,417 60.8 
1959 3, 193 5,209 61. 3 
1958 3,102 4,927 63.0 
I 957 3,008 4,713 63.8 
1956 2,827 4,466 63.3 
1955 2,719 4,252 63.9 
Note.--Data for 1962-72 are not strictly comparable with 
those for prior years, which are for wages and salary income 
only and do not include earnings of self-employed persons. 
Source: Table prepared by Homen's Bureau, Employment 
Standards Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, from 
data published by Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of 
Commerce." (As set out in Kahn v. Shevin, 40 L. Ed., at P. 192) 
In Appellant's Brief the case of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 
41 L Ed. 2d 256, 94 S. Ct. 21158 (1974), is also cited in support of their positic 
This case, like the Kahn v. Shevin case, is improperly cited as being surportive 
of Appellant's position. The Court in Geduldig v. Aiello upheld the consti-
tutionality of a pregnancy exclusion from coverage under the California disabilic 
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insurance system that pays benefits to those privately employed who are tem-
porarily unable to work because of disability not covered by workmen's compen-
sation. The Supreme Court held that the coverage exclusion did not amount to an 
invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The Supreme Court in both the Kahn and~ cases held that there 
was no denial of Equal Protection and, thus, no discrimination where a statute 
which differentially treated the sexes could be supported by a rational basis 
test. The rule is that if a State Legislature has a valid, rational objective 
in mind when a statute is drafted and if the statute, in fact, effects this 
reasonable objective, the Supreme Court will uphold the statute. In our case 
it appears clear from the Utah case law that an attitude exists in the State 
of Utah which was acknowledged by the State Legislature in drafting the Utah 
dower statute. This statute takes into account the sociological conditions in 
the State of Utah. The conditions are such that women, despite great advances 
made in the area of equal pay, etc., are still in an inferior economic position, 
and therefore in greater need of certain protections. Utah Courts must follow 
the logical analysis of the Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court noted, in the 
case of Quang Wing v. Kirkendahl, 223 U.S. 59, 56 L. Ed. 350, 32 S. Ct. 192 
(1912), a case dealing with a Montana statute which differentially imposed a 
certain 1 icense tax on men and women in the laundry business: 
''If Montana deemed it advisable to put a 1 ighter burden upon 
women than upon men with regard to employment .•• the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not interfere by creating a fictitious equality 
where there is a real difference." (56 L. Ed., at P. 352) 
- 11 -
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lt is Respondents 1 pas it ion that in the State of Utah there is a 
real difference between men and women in their ability to acquire and hold 
property. This attitude, which has been acknowledged by the Legislature in 
drafting Section 74-4-3 of Utah Code Annotated, is not based on any fictitious 
stereotype of woman as a weaker member of the species, but rather upon a 
realistic appraisal of the present economic conditions faced by the two 
sexes in the State of Utah. In the case at hand we have a clear example of 
the very situation the Legislature had in mind when this statute was drafted. 
The statute was drafted to protect wo~en from, among other things, those 
debts of their spouses which they had had no part in creating, which operated 
to deprive them, and possibly their children, of important, vital rights in 
property. 
Appellant's contention that Section 74-4-3 of the Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953), is unconstitutional as a denial of Due Process is very weak. 
Most of the case law cited by Appellant is in support of the denial of 
Equal Protection assertion. 
The Utah case of Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 
44, 96 S. Ct. 249, 46 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1975), is cited in support of Appellant's 
claim that the Utah Statute constitutes a denial of Due Process. 
This case involved a Utah statute which made pregnant women ineligible 
for unemployment benefits for a period of t1·1elve weeks before expected 
childbirth up tflrough six weeks after childbirth. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that the statute violated no constitutional guarantee. The United States 
Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Due Process clause of the Four· 
teenth Amendment. It is clear that the facts in this case are easily 
- 12 -
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distinguishable from the facts in our case. The~. supra, statute 
deprived the Appellant of a "basic human liberty". There is no deprivation 
or "taking" of any basic right in the case before the Court. On the contrary, 
Respondents are seeking to have a right, created by statute, enforced as to 
a woman who qua! ifies for said right. 
Appellants have failed to prove that either a denial of Equal Pro-
tection or of Due Process exists in the suit before the Court. 
The Legislatures and Courts of this Country have been quite 
insistant in correcting inequalities in our society. There are many "Affirm-
ative Action Prograris" adopted by the Courts and the Leg is I atures to improve 
the lot of disadvantaged persons. Examples of these are many fold including 
the school busing program, veteran's program, minority training employment 
program, etc. Consent to Court decrees in cases such as the American Telephone 
and Telegraph case, Bank of America case, etc. requires special action and 
expenditures to improve the portion of the lot of women and minorities 
and require artificial stimulas to employnent and payment practices to assist 
these disadvantaged groups. From the history of the statutory dower section, 
it is obvious that the Courts and Legislatures considered women, as they 
related to landholdings, to be a disadvantaged group; and the Utah laws 
recognizing do11er rights in women in creating the statutory dower are his-
torical atte1""1ps to recognize the difference between the sexes and create 
affirmative act ion programs to protect these people. It would seem ridic-
ulous to strike do11n a proven and effective affirmative action program with 
historical roots on one hand, while Courts and Legislatures are insisting 
that the citizenry adopt and enforce similar programs. 
- 13 -
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POI NT 111 
SECTION 74-4-3 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED 
TO THE CASE AT HAND. -
Appellants assert, that Section 74-4-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended in 1953, is unconstitutional as applied to Respondents. It is 
Appellant's contention that Jeanne D. Heyer sold her dower right, and by so 
doing relinquished any and all rights she had to the property in question. 
Appel I ant further contends that since Respondent, Sterling A. Meyer, is still 
alive Jeanne D. Meyer is precluded from taking her dower right. 
Section 74-4-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, provides that a 
wife must meet certain qualifications before she can claim her dOl"er interest 
which were disucussed herein in Point of Respondents' Brief. Si nee her 
husband acquired the real estate during coveture and Jeanne D. Heyer has not 
released her rights therein she met all of the requirements under the 
statute necessary to claim her legal interest in the real estate. Jeanne D. 
Meyer, along with her husband, Sterling A. Meyer, contracted to sell 
the subject property to a third party. Appellant contends that this is 
a relinquishment of her d01·1er rights. Since Jeanne Meyer is to be paid for 
her dower right, pursuant to the above described sale, there can be 1 ittle 
doubt that sh.e is relinquishing her dower right as to purchaser. Further, 
in being compensated for selling the property, she is being compensated for 
her dower right, and her do1-1er right is being recognized in the sale to the 
third party. The Appellant is attempting to take her dower right 1vithout 
Mrs. Meyer's consent and without compensation and the Court should not condo~ 
such conduct. 
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The case law cited by Appellant with respect to this argument does 
not apply to this case. 
The argument that Respondent, Jeanne D. Meyer, has no interest 
since she is not a widow is ridiculous. Respondent is not asserting that 
Jeanne D. Meyer is a widow, but that she has an incohate interest in the 
real property. Although the interest does not vest until the death of the 
husband, it clearly exists at this time. Appellant cites the case of In Re 
Madsen's Estate , 259 Pac. 2d 595, this case is cited for the proposition 
that where a v.o~an joins in a contract for the sale of land owned by her 
husband she thereby relinquishes her incohate right of dower in the real 
property covered by the contract. This Court in~ notes that the right 
of dower or its statutory equivalent has always been highly favored in the 
law and the purpose of the dower statute is to assure an interest in the 
property and support to the widow after the death of the husband and the 
Court points out: 
11 
••• the Court cannot preserve and ho Id for a widow some 
thing that she has voluntarily sold or disposed of. 
Dower cannot be revived at the cost of a wife's liberty 
to contract. The Court cannot arbitrarily vitiate a 
sale that has been voluntarily made ••• " (G03) 
It is clear that the Court in Madsen, ruled as it did because 
the wife was seeking to assert her dower right to invalidate a contract in 
which she had intelligently and willingly entered. This situation is 
obviously different from the case before the Court where the Appellant 
seeks to take Mrs. Meyer's interest without consent or compensation. 
-15-
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Appellant's final contention is that the wife's dmier 
interest is in the real property itself and not in the proceeds from 
any sale or other disposition of the real property. Appellant cites 
the case of In Re Park's, 31 Utah 255, 87 Pac. 900 (1906). 
Appellant has not understood and has improperly reported 
the Park's case. fn the Park case, the widow had the election of claim-
int her interest in the real estate, or the proceeds thereof, or making 
a claim against her husband's estate for the value that he had received. 
The Court accurately stated that her interest 1vas in the land not against 
her husband's estate. The Court stated, page 903, " ... her right is 
against the land against which it constitutes a vested and enforceable 
interest and encumbrance in her favor." In this case, Mrs. Meyer is 
claiming her interest in the land. She refused to release her dower 
interest to the Appellant and insisted that she be paid therefor. Mrs. 
Meyer has not relinquished her interest in the real estate to the 
Appellant, but has only stated that she would release her interest to a 
buyer upon the payment of an amount she determined to be reasonable value 
of her inchoate interest. 
The only matter decided in the Park estate 1·1as that the 
wife's interest was in the land and equal to "one-third of the value of 
all legal or equitable estates in the real property possessed by the 
husband at any tirie during the r.1arriuge" (page 902). Mrs. Meyer had 
an interest in the real estate and consented to the sale of that inchoate 
interest conditioned only that she be paid therefor. The Appellant seeks 
to take her consideration which is her port ion of the real estate und, as 
stated in the statute "one-third of the vci I uP". 
-lG-
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CONCLUS rori 
The constitutionality of Section 74-11-3 of the Utah Code 
Annotated seems clear after an analysis of Utah case law and the recent 
Supreme Court decisions in the area of Equal Protection and Due Process. 
Appellants have contended that this statute is unconstitutional as a denial 
of Equal Protect ion and Due Process unsupported by any "compel Jing State 
interest". The discuss ion herein of case law, pub! ic pol icy, constitutional 
authority, statutory law, etc. makes it clear that there is a compelling 
State interest for the dower provision in the State of Utah. This law 
which has essentially been in effect throughout the history of Utah, is 
based on a recognition by the Legislature of the existing sociological con-
ditions in this State. It isn't up to individuals in the State or to the 
State's Court to determine what is reasonable and what laws fairly comply 
with the existing sociological conditions in the State. It is within the 
preview of the State's Legislature to determine what is reasonable and what is 
in the best interest of the State, as long as this is in keeping with the 
Constitution. 
For generations, the citizenry has accommodated its actions 
to account for the protection afforded wives by the dower statutes and 
no pressing need for revolution is indicated. 
This action is not brought by a husband or wife claiming 
unfair or unequal treatment; but by an outsider attempting to benefit at 
the expense of the marital union. 
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The Appeal should be dismissed thereby confirming the 
wife's statutory dower interest as provided by the Statutes of the 
State of Utah. 
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